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SUMMARY 
 
This report on the Sumatra-Andaman great earthquake and tsunami of December 26, 
2004 describes the event and its impacts in southern Thailand. It includes the 
observations of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering Reconnaissance 
Team gathered one month after the event. The report covers the effects of the tsunami 
on the natural and built environment, and the recovery process in relation to social and 
economic issues. Lessons applicable to the understanding and potential mitigation of 
tsunami risk in New Zealand are presented and discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On December 26, 2004, the boundary between elements of 
the Indo-Australian plate and the Eurasian plate, offshore 
northern Sumatra, Indonesia ruptured in a great (moment 
magnitude 9.3) earthquake - second only to the 1960 
Chilean earthquake in recorded magnitude (Stein and Okal, 
2005). Up to 15 m of thrust movement on the plate interface 
caused a massive shift of the seafloor and displaced tens of 
cubic kilometres of seawater, generating tsunami waves that 
radiated across the Indian Ocean (Ni et al., 2005; Lay et al., 
2005). The earthquake was widely felt throughout South 
Asia and was locally destructive in Sumatra and the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands that parallel the plate 
boundary. However, it was the tsunami that transferred 
energy with efficiency and devastating effect from the 
remote epicentral region to densely populated coastal 
communities thousands of kilometres away.  
 
In Sumatra, where the tsunami made landfall within 10-15 
minutes, run-up heights1 of over 30 m (Banda Aceh) were 
recorded. Run-up heights of more than 10 m were also 
documented in Thailand (1214 m) and Sri Lanka (11 m).  
Documented fatalities eventually exceeded 283,000 with 
the heaviest losses concentrated along the west coast of 
Sumatra, but more than 40,000 were also accounted for on 
distant shores around the Indian Ocean. More than 1 million 
people were displaced (USGS, 2005). 
 
The scale and impact of this disaster is unparalleled in 
recent history. It occurred suddenly and affected many 
nations distant from its direct physical effects. In addition to 
the heavy casualties in densely populated local 
communities, many of those affected in Thailand, Sri Lanka 
and the Maldives were foreign tourists.    
 
In Thailand, the tsunami death toll climbed to around 5,300 
of which around 50% were foreign nationals, a majority 
from northern Europe. A further 3,000 persons were 
missing or unaccounted for in the aftermath (Guy 
Carpenter, 2005). At the request of the Thai Government 
several nations, including New Zealand, provided 
specialised medical and police forensic expertise to assist 
with disaster victim identification and repatriation (NZ 
Government, 2005)  
 
As the disaster response moved from the heavy rescue 
phase to relief and initial reconstruction, the Society 
(NZSEE) assembled an inter-disciplinary team to survey the 
impacts and recovery operations in southern Thailand 2 . 
Similarities to New Zealand infrastructure and topography 
and some shared principles of civil defence and emergency 
                                                 
1 Tsunami run-up is the vertical distance between the maximum 
height, reached by the water on shore and the mean-sea-level 
surface. 
2 The Society also sponsored Dr James Goff who participated in a 
United States tsunami reconnaissance mission to Sri Lanka (Liu et 
al., 2005).  
management in Thailand made this a region of interest for 
lessons applicable to New Zealand.  
 
Topic areas of interest and expertise included: 
 
• Assessment of variable wave recession and attack time-
lapse at different localities based on interviews with 
survivors, and relationship to coastal geometry, 
bathymetry and extent of inundation; 
 
• Engineering assessment of impacts of waves and 
transported debris on built structures and engineering 
lifelines along the coast (roading, bridges, 
communications, water and waste, coastal piers or 
jetties); 
 
• Assessment of the challenges related to management of 
the rescue and recovery efforts at a national and local 
level, including the demands that arise from world-wide 
interest and concern; 
 
• Preliminary assessment of the socio-economic impacts on 
local communities, particularly disruption to businesses 
and primary-production.  
 
The team visited Thailand from 24 January to 1 February, four 
weeks after the event. Discussions were held among 
representatives of Thai institutions and government 
departments in Bangkok before proceeding to affected areas 
along the Andaman coast. This timing enabled both the 
damage to be surveyed (despite extensive clean-up operations) 
and an appraisal of how the recovery operations and 
community response was progressing.  
 
This paper discusses our insights into the physical damage 
inflicted by the tsunami through to lessons from the initial 
emergency response and the subsequent socio-economic 
recoverywhich will continue for several years.    
 
The team was led by Hugh Cowan, a geoscientist with 
experience of hazard monitoring systems and post-earthquake 
reconnaissance. Rob Bell, a coastal engineer and scientist 
documented hydraulic effects of the tsunami on the natural and 
built environment. Noel Evans, a structural engineer and 
lifelines group coordinator observed the damage to engineered 
structures and lifelines, Erica Dalziell, a risk management 
specialist, assessed the impact of the disaster in terms of pre-
event vulnerability and post-event reconstruction. Mike 
OLeary, national controller for the Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management (MCDEM), and Bernie Rush, an 
emergency management advisor to MCDEM, researched the 
organisation and control of regional and national coordinating 
structures for response and recovery and the management of 
international assistance. Lawrence Yule, Mayor of Hastings 
and member of the National Council of Local Government 
New Zealand, took special note of potential lessons for 
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planning and risk management in New Zealand coastal 
communities.  
The team was guided by colleagues in Thailand. Ms 
Kamolrat Saringkarnphasit, a seismologist with the Thai 
Meteorological Department, accompanied the mission. Dr 
Adichat Surinkum, geologist and Director of the 
Geotechnical Division of the Department of Mineral 
Resources, contributed valuable additional guidance in the 
field during part of the mission. 
 
2. THE SUMATRA-ANDAMAN EARTHQUAKE 
SEQUENCE AND TSUNAMI 
 
The great Sumatra-Andaman earthquake of December 26, 
2004 initiated at a depth of about 30 km beneath the Sunda 
Trench off the west coast of Sumatra, Indonesia [3.244°N; 
95.825°E] at 00:59 UTC 1  (Stein and Okal, 2005). The 
rupture propagated upwards on a shallow-dipping (8°) fault 
plane and northward along the Nicobar and Andaman 
islands that delineate the boundary between the Indo-
Australian plate and the southern edge of the Eurasian plate 
(Ni et al., 2005; Bilham, 2005), (Figure 1 and 2).  
 
Up to 15 metres of thrust displacement was accommodated 
at the plate interface within a few minutes, offshore from 
Banda Aceh, Sumatra where the strongest excitation of the 
tsunami occurred (Figure 2) (Lay et al., 2005). Farther 
north, the rupture slowed considerably and for the last five 
of its eleven minutes duration, no further tsunami waves 
were produced. During the following hour, however, this 
northern section of the rupture accumulated many metres of 
slip, which contributed perhaps a third of the total energy 
released. This slow slip accounted for a three-fold upward 
revision of magnitude from 9.0 to 9.3 (Bilham, 2005). Later 
analysis of continuous-recording GPS stations revealed that 
co-seismic horizontal displacements had occurred over a 
vast region  from decimetre-scale shifts at the nearest 
stations (e.g. 270 mm at Phuket, Thailand, 400 km to the 
east) to several millimetres measured at points in southern 
China, the Philippines and India (Vigny et al., 2005).  
The total length of the rupture is comparable to the 
distribution of aftershocks, which is more than 1,200 km for 
the December 26 event. This increases to more than 1,600 
km when the contiguous Nias earthquake (moment 
magnitude Mw 8.7) of March 28, 2005 is included (Figure 
2). The March 28 earthquake indicated further rupture of 
the plate interface to the southeast and raised concern about 
the altered state of stress and possibly heightened tsunami 
hazard on adjoining sections of the plate boundary. 
Large earthquakes are known to have ruptured the 
Andaman section of the over-thrust plate boundary in 1847 
(Mw 7.5), 1881 (Mw 7.9), 1941 (Mw 7.7) and, in the 
                                                 
1 (7:59am local time and 12:59pm NZST) 
northern Andaman Sea, a section of the Andaman Ridge-
Transform boundary near the coast of Myanmar, in 1930 (Mw 
7.3) (Nutalaya et al., 1985; Ortiz and Bilham, 2003; Bilham et 
al., 2005) (Figure 1). Those historical events produced tsunami 
that, while locally destructive in the islands, had limited 
regional impact, probably due to their involving slip on deeper 
parts on the plate interface than occurred on Dec. 26, 2004. 
The earthquakes of 1930, centered in the far north of the 
Andaman Sea on a section of the plate boundary characterised 
by right-lateral strike-slip faulting, destroyed the ancient 
seaport of Pegu. Tsunami associated with those events caused 
severe flooding and fatalities in Myanmar (Nutalaya et al., 
1985).  
Farther south, offshore from Sumatra, the potential for great 
earthquakes has long been recognised from historical events 
with estimated magnitudes even larger than those mentioned 
above (Newcomb and McCann, 1987). Earthquakes there, in 
1797 (Mw 8.4), 1833 (Mw 9) and 1861 (Mw 8.5) generated 
large tsunami. The waves of the 1833 event probably made 
landfall nearby with heights  in the range 5-10 m (Cummins 
and Leonard, 2004). A smaller event (Mw 7.8) in 1907 just 
south of the December 26 rupture zone also produced a locally 
destructive tsunami in northern Sumatra (Newcomb and 
McCann, 1987). The inferred rupture area of that and the 
adjoining 1861 event were broken again by the recent (March 
28, 2005) Nias earthquake. 
3. TSUNAMI INUNDATION 
 
The December 26, 2004 tsunami made landfall along the 
northwest coast of Sumatra and its offshore islands within tens 
of minutes after the earthquake. During the ensuing hour or so, 
flow depths of between nine and fifteen metres flooded coastal 
regions to a maximum extent of inundation, that in some areas 
reached 3-4 km inland (Borrero, 2005; Yalciner et al., 2005). 
Run-up heights ranging from 2-3 metres to more than 30 
metres were later documented. The impacts were generally 
catastrophic although there were local examples of effective 
self-evacuation that averted significant loss of life2. 
 
In Thailand, the tsunami wave train first reached the nearshore 
waters off Phuket Island (Figure 2 and 3) around 1.7 hours 
after the earthquake, initially as the negative part of the wave 
(trough). This trough was the first visible sign of the tsunami 
observed as coastal waters quickly receding offshore to below 
the low tide mark 3 . This occurred over a period of about 
eleven minutes, exposing rocks that are normally submerged 
and stranding fish (and yachts). Unfortunately, many people  
                                                 
2 Yalciner et al. (2005) reported that inhabitants of Simuelue, an island 
in the epicentral region, self-evacuated the coast immediately 
following the earthquake and suffered only eight fatalities from a total 
population of ~78,000. This successful action was attributed to 
retained community learning from the destructive impact of tsunami 
that accompanied the Mw 7.8 earthquake of 1907.  
3 The opposite occurred in countries to the west e.g., Sri Lanka and 
India, where the damaging wave crest arrived first (i.e. not heralded by 
receding waters). 
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Figure 1. Historical large and great earthquakes of the Andaman plate boundary and region adjacent to the December 26, 
2004 and March 28, 2005 earthquakes. Events of magnitude 7.0 or greater and depth < 100 km. Compiled from 
catalogues of the International Seismological Centre (ISC) and the National Earthquake Information Center 
(NEIC) Preliminary Determination of Epicentres (PDE).  
 
 
were enticed by this unusual phenomenon and tragically 
drowned simply unaware of what was really happening.   
 
The first tsunami peak (wave crest) arrived around two 
hours after the earthquake (~10:00am local time), initially 
striking the west-coast beaches of Phuket Island. Twenty 
five minutes later the waves rolled ashore at Khao Lak, 70 
km farther north (Thompson, 2005). At around the same 
time, Phi Phi Island, located to the southeast of Phuket, was 
hit and a little later, the mainland of Krabi province farther 
to the southeast (Figure 1).  
 
The best documented sea-level measurement on the open 
coast was obtained by a sounder on the yacht Mercator one 
nautical mile off Phuket beaches (Siffer, 2004). Three main 
waves were recorded at 12-13 minute intervals the first 
was the largest (6.6 m trough-to-crest), while the third wave 
reached the highest elevation (5 m above the tide). 
Unfortunately, the waves arrived right on high tide for the 
Andaman coast (these would have been 1.2 m lower if 
arrival was at low water). Based on several post-event field 
surveys conducted by various international teams (e.g. 
NOAA, 2005; Tsunami Lab, 2005; Kyoto University, 
2005), including our own measurements, the peak tsunami 
run-up heights are summarised in Table 1.   
 
TABLE 1: Peak tsunami run-up heights (m) above mean 
sea level for Andaman Coast (north to south on 
Figure 1). 
 
Location Peak run-up height 
(m) 
Ban Nam Kem 89 
Khao Lak 1214 
Kamala Beach 55.7 
Patong Beach 55.5 
Karon Beach 45 
Kata Beach 5.5 
Phi Phi (north) 78 
Phi Phi (south) 45 
Krabi 4.3 
 
Our tsunami reconnaissance surveys covered three main areas: 
Khao Lak region of Phang-Nga Province, Phuket Island (west 
coast) and the island of Koh Phi Phi in Krabi Province (Figure 
3). 
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Figure 2. Major structural elements of the Indo-Australian and Eurasian plate boundary, showing the mainshock and 
aftershocks for the December 26, 2004 Great Sumatran-Andaman earthquake (Mw 9.3) (black symbols), and the 
contiguous Nias earthquake (Mw 8.6) of March 28, 2005 and combined aftershocks thereafter (grey symbols). The 
earthquake sequence encompasses a rupture zone 1,600 km long and 200 km wide. Strong excitation of the 
December 26 tsunami occurred between the mainshock epicentre, offshore Sumatra and the Nicobar Islands 
(shading) within the first four minutes of the rupture (Lay et al., 2005). All aftershocks shown are for events of 
magnitude 5 or greater from the PDE catalogue of the NEIC; ART=Andaman Ridge-Transform zone. 
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Figure 3. Simplified map of the Andaman Coast, Thailand showing localities mentioned in the text. 
 
Khao Lak (Phang-Nga province)―the Khao Lak area is 70 
km north of the Phuket causeway on Highway 4 (Figure 3).  
In between there is limited coastal population and 
development. The Khao Lak tourist region is located on a 
narrow coastal beach strip 1520 km in length bounded by 
mountainous terrain. Feeder roads of a few hundred metres 
to a few kilometres off Highway 4 lead to individual or 
clustered resorts fronted by golden sandy beaches. This 
region had grown to become a booming tourist destination 
in the last five years.  
 
Khao Lak was hit by tsunami waves with measured run-ups 
varying from 4 m up to 14 m, suffering the most serious 
devastation in terms of people killed and hotel/resort 
damage (Figure 4 and 5). Few of the hotels or resorts in 
Khao Lak, which had a total of around 5,500 rooms, were 
left standing. It is estimated that more than 1,000 people 
died in Khao Lak and 80% of the coastal facilities suffered 
serious damage. It is estimated that the lethality ratio in the 
impacted coastal strip was around 25% of people (EEFIT, 
2005). Penetration inland was up to 3 km in the widest part 
of the coastal strip at Pakarang Cape (Figure 3). In central 
Khao Lak, a police patrol boat off Bang Niang Beach was 
driven by the tsunami 1.2 km inland, narrowly missing a 
shopping complex (Figure 6). While damage was severe to 
resorts along the coastal strip, the town of Khao Lak and the 
main road farther inland suffered only moderate damage in 
low-lying areas and adjacent to rivers. The reason for the 
tsunami run-up height being so much higher at Khao Lak was 
due to wave amplification across the broad shallow shelf 
offshore of Khao Lak compared with the more steeply rising 
seafloor off the coast of Phuket Island (Royal Thai Navy, 
1981)  
 
Koh Phi Phi (Krabi province)―Phi Phi is a butterfly-shaped 
island, with a low-lying narrow strip of sand (tombolo) formed 
over thousands of years between the lee of two steep rocky 
outcrops (Figure 7). The strip is only 150 m wide at its 
narrowest, increasing to 1,000 m at the base of the cliffs at 
each end. Further the sandbar is only one metre above high 
water in the narrowest section. Following a large recession of 
the sea (especially in the shallower northern bay), the tsunami 
wave peak arrived first in the northern bay inundating the 
entire sandbar to a depth of 78 m, washing debris into the 
southern bay (Ao Ton Sai). The island was then hit by the 
wave refracting around the island from the south a few 
minutes later. The refracted wave was half the height due to 
the deeper water present in Ao Ton Sai (where the wharves are 
located).  
 
On Phi Phi, about 1,400 resort rooms in 34 facilities were lost 
or damaged and up to 70% of the island was severely damaged 
(Guy Carpenter, 2005) as shown in Figure 8. The devastation 
witnessed at Phi Phi provided a salutary lesson of the 
vulnerability associated with extensive development on 
tombolos and sand spits in areas exposed to tsunami hazard. 
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Figure 4. Tsunami wave heights were inferred from strand-lines and watermarks on buildings. In this case a car was lifted 
above the roofline of a resort in Khao Lak (Photo Thai Meteorological Department). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Missing roof tiles indicate the tsunami torrent depth exceeded nine metres at this location in Khao Lak (Photo ED).  
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Figure 6. One of two police patrol vessels caught by the first tsunami wave off Khao Lak – this one was carried 1.2 km inland 
narrowly missing a shopping complex; the other vessel rolled and sank near the coast. (Photo RB). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Phi Phi Island viewed from the air as the team approached by helicopter from the southeast. The tsunami wave 
traversed the sand-spit at depths of up to nine metres, first from the north and a few minutes later again from the 
south (Photo ED). 
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Figure 8. The hospital on Koh Phi Phi was set back from the shore but situated close to sea-level. It was rendered inoperable 
by the tsunami, highlighting the critical need to locate such facilities outside potential inundation zones (Photo LY). 
 
 
Phuket Island (Phuket Province)―western beaches of 
Phuket were the first areas in Thailand to be impacted by 
the tsunami (Figure 3). Inundation heights varied 
considerably along the coast (Table 1) due to variations in 
the wave shoaling from sand bars and reefs on a coast with 
beaches aligned at different orientations. Beach condition 
was also a factor, with Karon Beach less affected because 
the foredune had been kept intact. Kamala Beach, with its 
extensive nearshore rock platform, was the location most 
seriously affected by the tsunami in Phuket and experienced 
significant loss of life.  
 
Although hotels and businesses in Kamala and Patong 
Beaches were heavily damaged, mainly the ground floors, 
initial surveys of hotels around the island indicated that less 
than 20% suffered serious damage (Guy Carpenter, 2005). 
Penetration of the tsunami inland was constrained by the 
density of buildings, but side roads leading off the main 
coastal road being perpendicular to the beach and parallel to 
the flow direction became swift torrents, transporting lethal 
volumes of debris.  Vehicles were piled up in stacks at the 
ends of these roads, whereas the alleyways off these side 
roads (being perpendicular to the flow and sheltered by 
buildings) incurred much less damage. A recurring theme of 
survival among those we interviewed involved split-second, 
counter-intuitive decisions to enter side alleys instead of 
running farther inland along the main side roads. Sheltered by 
buildings the side alleys afforded protection from high flow 
velocities and torrent depths encountered in the main streets. 
 
4. RESPONSE OF LIFELINES 
 
While the damage to engineering lifelines in the inundation 
zones was catastrophic the major arterial lifelines on the 
mainland were mostly located away from the coast and 
suffered relatively minor damage. 
 
Reinstatement of services to the coastal resort areas was 
progressively undertaken, based on need and the availability of 
resources. Lifelines on Koh Phi Phi were almost totally 
destroyed and even a month after the event, were operating on 
a temporary basis. 
 
4.1 Phuket International Airport 
 
Phuket International Airport, which quickly became the key 
lifeline for much of the response effort, had seawater break 
through its protective seawall and flood the runway. The 
transformer for runway lights was damaged and debris was 
transported in through an open channel (Ruangsassamee and 
Lukkunaprasit, 2005). However, airport emergency crews 
quickly re-established control and the airport reopened by 
131
early evening on the day of the tsunami to allow flights to 
and from Bangkok. 
 
4.2 Water Supply 
 
Many of the water supplies in the affected areas operate on 
a combination of reservoirs and underground aquifers. In 
some locations water towers are used to provide adequate 
pressure. With water supplies initially disrupted, response 
organisations relied on stocks of bottled water that is used 
extensively by the tourist industry. 
 
Water towers suffered damage (but seldom total collapse) 
and damage to pumps, in addition to water contamination, 
was widely observed. 
 
During the mission it was noted that HDPE pipe had been 
used extensively to reinstate water mains. This had the 
advantage that it could be laid in long lengths with 
relatively easy fusion jointing. In some cases it appeared 
that existing HDPE water mains had remained intact in 
locations where roads had been scoured out and retaining 
walls had failed. 
 
4.3 Power Supply 
 
The main electrical transmission conductors extend down 
the centre of Phuket Island and were undamaged. A new 
distribution main conductor was under construction along 
the Phuket coastal resorts. At the time of the tsunami the 
damage to local distribution networks was extensive. 
Authorities moved very quickly to effect repairs, however. 
An example of quick repairs was the reinstatement of 
supply in parts of Phuket within one day and the submarine 
supply to offshore islands from Ban-Nam-Kem in Khao Lak 
was reinstated within five days of the event. 
 
4.4 Hospital Services 
 
Most major hospitals and clinics were located away from 
the inundation zones. However the hospital at Koh Phi Phi 
was located on the low lying tombolo at its narrowest 
width. 
 
The Phi Phi hospital was inundated by the first wave and 
rendered completely inoperable (Figure 8). Being the only 
emergency medical centre this meant that there was no 
medical treatment available until sufficient clearance of 
debris allowed emergency services to arrive from the 
mainland by helicopter. 
 
The example of Phi Phi hospital clearly demonstrates the 
need for planners to locate critical emergency response 
services in areas not at risk to tsunami (or flood) inundation 
or to make provision for the loss of such service centres. 
 
 
 
4.5 Sewerage Systems 
 
The Bangkok Post (30 Dec., 2004) reported that authorities 
were concerned about the massive amount of untreated 
municipal wastewater being discharged from the Phuket 
community of Patong into the Andaman Sea. The towns 
sewerage treatment plant was unable to treat its normal 10,000 
cubic metres of wastewater each day as the pump and 
regulator controls had failed. Many wastewater ponds and 
treatment tanks were also flooded, killing bacteria used for 
waste treatment. 
 
This was repeated at the many affected resort areas along the 
Thai coast. In some cases even though the plant (e.g. pumping 
stations) was not physically damaged, it was rendered 
inoperable by the tsunami having inundated the control 
electrics and mechanisms at various collection points (Figure 
9a and 9b). 
 
A month after the tsunami, minor sewer overflow discharges 
were still continuing at some beaches while authorities were 
waiting for repairs and replacement components. They were 
very aware of the need for speedy repairs to preserve the 
pristine image for the numerous resorts. 
 
4.6 Roads 
 
Damage to coastal roads in Phuket appears to have been 
quickly repaired with access still available by numerous roads 
from the unaffected eastern coast. 
 
One of the two bridges connecting the main Highway 402 of 
Phuket Island to the mainland and Phang Nga Province, was 
closed for three or four days while repairs were effected. 
 
One road bordering the coast at Kamala Beach (Phuket Island) 
suffered extensive damage. Here the impact of the tsunami 
destroyed the protecting seawall and bodily shunted the 
asphalt of a section laterally by about 600 mm so that it was 
forced over the concrete roadside stormwater drain cover 
(Figure 10). 
 
In Khao Lak, Highway 4 runs close to the coast and was 
inundated in many places. Thus it was some time before 
access to this area was reinstated and news of the greater 
losses and more extensive damage to the Khao Lak area 
became known. 
 
At a number of Khao Lak coastal resorts the outgoing sea 
waters (following each wave inundation) caused extensive and 
deep outwash scour channels causing numerous coastal side-
road dropouts. Since these resorts were far from re-
establishing at the time of our visit, these dropouts had yet to 
be repaired. 
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Figure 9a and 9b.  Inspecting damage to a sewerage pumping station at Kata Beach, Phuket Island. Electrical control systems 
were damaged beyond repair, causing sewer overflows into the adjacent stream, and discharge onto the 
nearby beach (Photos RB and HC). 
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Figure 10.  Damage to roads was locally severe due to scouring. At Kamala Beach, Phuket Island, where the torrent depth was 
3-4 m, the beach-front road pavement was shifted landward 600 mm onto the adjacent stormwater drain cover. 
 
 
5. PERFORMANCE OF STRUCTURES 
 
5.1 Thai Building Regulations 
 
Locating definitive information on the Thai building 
regulations and codes during the visit was limited to a few 
documents available in English. General descriptions were 
provided however, as the tour proceeded. 
 
The Bangkok Metropolitan Authority Building Regulations 
(2001) that were adopted by most provinces are mostly 
descriptive planning rules. The only structural items 
specifically covered include wind loads, minimum concrete 
cover thicknesses, and the need to fix reflective glass 
enclosures. 
 
A seismic loading code, Ministerial Building Control 
Regulation No 49 (dated 1997) applies only to larger and 
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public buildings, in the seismically-active northern 
provinces of Thailand. The provisions of this code did not 
apply to Bangkok nor to the south-western coastal 
provinces that we visited. 
 
During 2003  2004 the National Earthquake Committee of 
Thailand included a study of the dynamic response of 
structures in Bangkok and other cities in the Seismic 
Hazard and Mitigation of Seismic Risk Project (Phase 1). It 
was anticipated that Phase 2 of this project would lead to 
the development of seismic requirements for Bangkok and 
the other cities. 
 
During our tour we were informed that a conference of 
representatives of the Thai construction industry in mid-
January 2005 reviewing damage to buildings from the 
tsunami recommended the adoption of Ministerial Building 
Control Regulation No 49 in all provinces of Thailand. 
 
Under prevailing building regulation requirements, much 
appears to have been left to building owners and developers 
to set their own levels for design and construction 
monitoring. Foreign investors in Thailand, however, tended 
to insist that suitable internationally recognised standards 
were followed. 
 
Thus we observed the performance of hotels and resorts 
where the major buildings had generally been designed to 
recognised standards but had not been designed for lateral 
loads such as earthquake loadings. The standard of design 
and construction of older buildings, local residences, small 
shops, restaurants and some resort bungalows varied 
widely. Many were non-engineered structures. 
 
5.2 Typical Construction Systems 
 
The tourist resorts and hotels had developed at a 
phenomenal rate over the last few years particularly along 
the coast at Khao Lak. The resorts were mostly modern 
structures that included a combination of single storey 
bungalows and two or three storey blocks. 
 
The multiple-storey buildings generally consisted of 
reinforced concrete frame structures with reinforced 
concrete floor slabs cast over prestressed concrete planks. 
Casting the slabs in with the beams was shown to provide 
good diaphragm action. The details of reinforcing were as 
would be expected for non-seismic design detailing, 
especially beam/column junctions, lap lengths and 
confining reinforcing. In a number of cases these would not 
have complied with the requirements of ACl non-seismic 
design (Lukkunaprasit and Ruangsassamee, 2005). 
 
Exterior and partition walls were generally 100 mm thick 
and consisted of plastered unreinforced masonry. The roofs 
were either galvanised iron or tiles supported by timber 
framing. Extensive use was made of light suspended 
ceilings. 
Single storey buildings generally consisted of a basic frame of 
100×100 mm lightly reinforced concrete columns on a 
concrete slab with similar sized beams at eaves level. Walls 
were also plastered unreinforced masonry. Galvanised iron or 
tiled roofs were supported on timber framing (and more 
recently light gauge structural steel). 
 
5.3 Damage to Buildings 
 
The December 26 earthquake was felt in southern Thailand but 
was not sufficiently strong to cause structural damage. The 
tsunami torrents, however, generated very high dynamic face 
loading pressures on buildings, assessed by Thai engineers as 
high as 20 to 30 kPa. (Dr P. Warnitchai, pers. comm). These 
pressures were sufficient to blow out unreinforced masonry 
walls, sweep bungalows off their slab foundations and collapse 
many buildings. Damage was often initiated by the impact of 
trees, boats and cars that were engulfed by the tsunami. 
 
Within the Khao Lak area about 100 of the 143 hotels or 
resorts sustained damage and almost 80% of the room capacity 
was lost (EEFIT, 2005). This is reflected in the high casualty 
figures with about 70% of the life loss and missing persons for 
Thailand occurring in this region.  
 
Most of the damaged and collapsed single storey buildings had 
been cleared by the time of the visit. The extensive areas of 
cleared sand gave an indication of the large number of 
buildings that had been destroyed. These buildings included 
detached bungalows, bars, restaurants and those associated 
with the resorts. Those that remained standing through the 
torrent appeared to have been either well sheltered by 
buildings in front or were very well tied at foundation and 
eaves levels, with numerous partition walls (Figure 11). 
 
The remaining damaged single-storey buildings that we 
observed demonstrated a wide variety of failure mechanisms 
associated with inadequate detailing of reinforced concrete to 
sustain high lateral loads. For many the basic structure was a 
simple mechanism with little lateral bracing and inadequate 
jointing (Figure 12). 
 
The multi-storey buildings were extensively damaged in the 
ground floors with walls facing the torrent blasted through 
(Figure 13). Once the tsunami was able to flow through the 
lower storeys the loadings on the building would have been 
significantly reduced and the remaining walls, generally in the 
direction of flow, were able to provide in-plane resistance. An 
extreme example of the difference of impact forces occurred at 
Kamala Beach School, Phuket where a new school two-storey 
block under construction with no ground storey infill walls 
survived while two completed similar buildings were 
destroyed. 
 
The collapse of ground storeys of buildings created significant 
volumes of debris, which when added to furniture, building 
fittings picked up in the torrent and other debris made survival 
extremely difficult for anyone caught in it. 
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Figure 11.  View to seaward at one of the coastal resorts in Khao Lak. Foundations are all that remains of the single-storey 
buildings closest to the beach. A gradation in the severity of damage owed more to the protection afforded by 
adjacent structures than to the absolute distance inland (Photo HC). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.   Damage to reinforced concrete frame structures was only locally severe, where exposed structural elements were 
impacted by entrained debris (Photos NE and RB). 
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Figure 13.   One of resorts at Khao Lak located a few hundred metres from the shoreline, where the highest tsunami run-up 
(12 m) occurred. Water entered rooms even on the third floor, and in-fill block walls and windows on the first and 
second floors were punched out (Photo ED).  
 
 
Ten to twelve metre run up heights in Khao Lak meant that 
for many buildings the inundation extended to the second, 
and locally the third, storey. While the damage to partition 
walls was significantly less in the higher storeys, ceilings 
and furniture and fittings were caught up in the torrent and 
damage was frequently initiated by the impact of projectile 
logs and other debris (Figure 14). 
 
What had not been expected by our team was the extent of 
damage caused to buildings by the outwash flows in 
between incoming tsunami torrents. The inundations from 
the tsunami surge lasted for up to 10 minutes. After that the 
retreating water flowed to rivers, streams or the nearest low-
lying area, scouring wide deep channels that undermined 
buildings, bridge abutments and roads (Figure 15a and 15b). 
While buildings on piles remained stable, in some locations 
the scouring undermined buildings that led to collapse, 
especially for those on spread footings. In other locations 
well connected new structures on spread footings were 
bodily moved up to six metres and were left partially 
collapsed and leaning at odd angles. In one instance, in-
ground swimming pools were fully exhumed and unevenly 
displaced. The sand around some buildings showed signs of 
having liquefied leading to underground services tanks 
floating up above ground level (Figure 16). 
 
5.4 Damage to Wharves 
 
The benefit of well tied structures was demonstrated at Ban-
Nam-Kem fishing port where the wharf slabs were not 
constructed monolithically with the supporting beams. The 
tsunami lifted the slabs off the beams and then started a 
progressive collapse of the other structural elements (Figure 
17). 
 
5.5 Damage to Seawalls 
 
A number of seawalls were constructed to provide wave and 
storm-tide protection and retain land up to about a metre above 
beach level. These non-engineered walls collapsed seaward 
onto the beach during the outwash of the retreating waters 
(Figure 18). Typically these structures had no spread footing 
or deep piling. The combination of scour, possible liquefaction 
and the outgoing water tipped many lengths of wall seaward, 
enabling more scouring of the land and buildings behind.  
 
5.6 Damage to Bridges 
 
Damage to bridges was reported at low lying locations up to 
1.3 km inland from the coast. Side barriers were impacted and 
bent or sheared. We were unable to obtain details of the 
number of bridges that were damaged or needed replacement.  
 
The damage caused by scouring during the outwash phase 
exposed pilecaps and undermined stream protective works, 
particularly on the downstream side of bridges and culverts. 
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Figure 14.  Extraordinary volumes of debris were entrained by the tsunami and contributed to its destructive impact. This 
coconut palm trunk penetrated the roof and internal ceiling of a hotel on Koh Phi Phi (Photo ED). 
 
 
6. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND 
RESPONSE 
 
 
6.1 Emergency Management in Thailand 
 
The National Civil Defence Committee, chaired by the 
Minister of Interior, coordinates all activities relevant to 
civil defence and disaster management at a national level in 
Thailand. The committee consists of representatives from a 
number of national agencies, with its secretary the Director-
General of the Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation (DDPM).  
 
Regional Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Centers (12) are 
organised beneath the DDPM to render technical and auxiliary 
assistance to provincial civil defence committees, the latter 
chaired by the Governor of each province. These provincial 
organisations directed much of the emergency response to the 
tsunami impact. 
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Figure 15a and 15b. The receding waters after each wave caused substantial scouring of small streams and low-lying 
depressions, as shown here at Khao Lak. The scoured “channel” (15a) is 50 m wide and up to 3 m deep, 
completely undermining the resort buildings (15b) nearby (Photos RB). 
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Figure 16.  Liquefaction of soils appears to have occurred during the surge and withdrawal of tsunami waters at Khao Lak, 
with underground services such as this tank floating to the surface (Photo NE). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Severe damage to the wharf piles and topping at Ban Nam Kem, a fishing port north of Khao Lak, where the 
tsunami height reached nine metres (Photo HC).  
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Figure 18.  Receding waters (out-rush) caused collapse of most seawall defences from behind due to scouring (Photo RB). 
 
6.2 Emergency Response to the Tsunami 
 
One month after the tsunami the response phase was 
completely over. The Emergency Operation Centres 
(EOCs) established for this purpose had been dis-
established so there was no opportunity to view them in 
operation to assess their effectiveness. However, two of our 
team (MOL and BR) met the Director of the Policy Bureau 
of DDPM, Mr. Jakarin Hongsahul, in Phuket, to discuss 
aspects of the emergency response to the tsunami disaster.  
The emergency response structure depicted in papers provided 
by DDPM is very similar to the New Zealand CIMS 
(Coordinated Incident Management System) model. However, 
Thailand has a centrist command and control ethos backed by 
significant Government resources. The Thai approach could be 
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compared with what New Zealand would have done under 
the old Civil Defence Act 1983, with government resources 
as they were before 1984.  
We understood that the EOCs had been multi-agency, with 
effective sharing of information between all of the 
organisations. Initially there were three EOCs operating. 
This was later expanded to six. The Prime Minister 
appointed a Minister to perform an equivalent role to that of 
National Controller in New Zealand. The Minister in turn 
appointed regional governors to local controller roles. 
Initially, resources were overwhelmed, but machinery and 
manpower in the form of Defence Force, DDMP and 
private contractor resources had allowed Thai authorities to 
clean up many areas that were inundated by the tsunami 
within a few weeks. 
The same resources had constructed 16 substantial, fully-
serviced temporary residential camps for displaced persons 
and to begin the construction of more substantial transit 
accommodation for displaced families living in those 
camps. Our team observed armed forces personnel carrying 
out reconstruction work in the devastated fishing village of 
Ban Nam Kem. 
Most international response aid agencies only remained in 
Thailand for a very short time. Of those we knew of 
remaining in the country most appeared to be involved in 
disaster victim identification or advising(?) on risk 
mitigation and recovery issues. 
Near Khao Lak the team encountered a group of local and 
international volunteers, established in a resort complex. 
They appeared to be attracting more people to join them 
through a website www.tsunamivolunteer.net under the 
auspices of a local Thai NGO.  
As a result of talking with this volunteer group we 
identified a number of issues. There was no formal 
leadership of the group. Strong-willed individuals appeared 
to be making decisions following informal daily meetings. 
Each day at these meetings the approximately 100 
volunteers discussed among themselves what activities they 
would undertake that day. Money was also collected from 
the volunteers at the conclusion of the meeting. There 
appeared to be no forward planning, nor any link with other 
organisations to ascertain how best they could assist the 
community. Many of the volunteers we spoke to had arrived 
in the country hoping to get work with international NGOs 
such as Red Cross, but had been turned away.  
These people were both a significant positive resource and a 
significant burden on the local Thai community. We judged 
their contributions would have been far more effective had 
they been integrated into formal relief efforts. The lesson 
for New Zealand should a major disaster strike, would be to 
identify this volunteer resource (international and national) 
at points of entry and channel it into appropriate relief 
activities. 
 
7. CASUALTIES AND HEALTH  
 
Casualties from Khao Lak and Koh Phi Phi were taken to 
hospitals at Takua Pa and Krabi, respectively. From Takua Pa, 
patients with serious injuries were evacuated to larger 
hospitals elsewhere. As mentioned in Section 4.4 the hospital 
on Koh Phi Phi was completely destroyed by the tsunami and 
injured survivors had to wait hours for evacuation by 
helicopter before receiving medical attention.  
 
A surgeon at the Takua Pa district hospital explained that 
during December 26 more than two thousand people arrived at 
the emergency department where seven doctors and ten nurses 
treated more than one thousand patients, including 
approximately 300 foreigners. The most common injuries were 
respiratory insufficiency, lacerations and lower limb fractures. 
Many of the wounds were described as extremely dirty 
requiring extensive irrigation. Infections were common with 
many tsunami survivors readmitted for debridement of wounds 
and treatment with potent antibiotics. Aspiration pneumonia 
related to near drowning in contaminated seawater presented 
in numerous cases at Takua Pa and elsewhere (Kateruttanakul 
et al., 2005) posing additional challenges for casualty 
planning.  
 
Prior to the December 26 event, a commonly-used rule-of-
thumb based on past events was that most deaths and injuries 
in a tsunami are caused by debris entrained by the tsunami 
torrent. However, in Thailand, based on interviews with 
hospital authorities and disaster victim identification teams, 
drowning was by far the most common cause of death and 
aspiration pneumonia the most common injury/illness. It 
appears that this shift in type of casualties was due to the sheer 
depth of water that inundated the land, particularly in the Khao 
Lak area. 
 
 
8. SOCIAL ISSUES 
 
Besides the resort areas, a fishing village called Ban Nam Kem 
north of Khao Lak was largely destroyed with heavy loss of 
life. More than 5,000 survivors were distributed among 16 
temporary camps managed by the Department of Social 
Development with assistance from the Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior.  
 
8.1 Distribution of Aid 
 
In the days shortly following the tsunami, the Thai government 
set up a disaster assistance programme which provided 
immediate humanitarian aid such as food and shelter, and an 
initial lump-sum payment of 2,000 baht/person (approx 
USD$50) as well as 40,000 baht (USD$1,000) for each family 
with members dead or missing (FES and MAC 2005). Of the 
120,000+ Burmese migrant workers in the area, 10,000 were 
estimated to be directly affected but only 20% were believed 
to be registered with the authorities (Bangkok Post, 
27/01/2005). 
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8.2 Looking to the future 
 
We talked with many local Thais about their plans for the 
future.  At that time, one month after the tsunami, we struck 
people at differing stages of coping with the tragedy.  Some 
were still in a state of shock; like a couple at Kamala beach, 
whose house and small beachside restaurant had both been 
destroyed.  They had no plans or ideas on what the future 
might hold.  Others, who had similarly lost both home and 
business, were further along in the grieving process, already 
looking to find alternative futures for themselves and their 
families.  A significant challenge for these affected 
communities will be finding ways to support each other 
when all are suffering.  Keeping the community together 
over the long recovery process ahead will also be 
challenging.  Particularly in areas like Khao Lak, where the 
tourist economy is unlikely to resume at pre-tsunami levels 
for at least 12 months, possibly longer, people may move 
from the area either temporarily or permanently.   
 
 
9. IMPACT ON BUSINESSES 
 
Though the financial implications of the 2004 earthquake 
and tsunami pale in comparison to the human death toll, 
economic losses arising from the catastrophe are still 
expected to be substantial in several countries (including 
Thailand). According to Munich Re (2005), the economic 
damage from the disaster may total more than 10bn Euro 
(USD$13bn). This would make the event the fourth 
costliest disaster of 2004, behind the Japanese earthquake in 
October (USD$28bn), hurricane Charley (USD$21.3bn) 
and hurricane Ivan (USD$20bn). 
 
9.1 Tourism Industry 
 
The regions affected by the tsunami were significant in 
terms of Thailands overall tourist economy.  According to 
Tourist Authority Thailand (TAT) statistics (TAT, 2005a), 
in 2003 the six affected provinces earned USD$1.9bn 
accounting for 25% of Thailands total tourism revenue.  
Nearly 80% of this sum was earned in Phuket alone.  The 
tsunami struck right at the start of the peak tourist season, 
when the area generates two-thirds of its annual income.   
 
The Tourism Council of Thailand estimates that Phuket 
Province lost at least USD$500m in revenue in the three 
months following the tsunami (Phuket Gazette, 17/05/05). 
The Tourism Ministry estimates that about 180,000 people 
in the tourism industry have lost their jobs and another 
80,000 are at risk (UNDP, 2005a). 
 
The recovery of tourism infrastructure and services is 
expected to vary along the affected coast.  At the time of 
our visit, only one month after the tsunami, there were 
already distinct differences in the recovery rate of different 
areas.  Areas such as Patong beach in Phuket, where wave 
heights reached 5-5.5 m, were already well on the way to 
recovery.  Many businesses had reopened, albeit in the midst 
of ongoing construction, and tourists were slowly filtering 
back into the area.  Several factors contribute to this rapid 
recovery.  In Patong Beach a relatively low proportion of 
resorts were seriously damaged (estimated at less than 20%, 
Guy Carpenter, 2005).  Patong Beach also had a well 
established and thriving tourism economy, meaning businesses 
near the beach were likely to have been in a strong financial 
position prior to the event.   
 
Relatively quickly after the event, TAT also embarked on 
significant marketing strategies to restore the confidence of 
domestic and international travelers, with targeted marketing 
campaigns to promote the Andaman Coast as open for 
business.  They also facilitated Agent Education visits, where 
media and travel operators were invited to visit affected areas 
and conduct site inspections of hotels and attractions that had 
re-opened (TAT, 2005b). 
 
In other regions, the recovery is proceeding at a much slower 
rate.  The scene at Phi Phi Island was one of near total 
destruction.  Very little clearing work had been undertaken 
after four weeks, with streets and shops piled high with debris.  
One of the major challenges for recovery on Phi Phi is that all 
debris must be removed from the island by barge.  At the time 
of our first visit, there was only one backhoe and two dump 
trucks working on the island.  The psychological impact this 
had on the population was significant.  However, on a 
subsequent visit one week later, substantial clean-up was 
underway with a noticeable rise in optimism. 
 
In Phi Phi many of the business owners we talked to had no 
indication of how long it might take to clear and rebuild their 
properties.  An estimate for Charlies Resort (one of the larger 
businesses) was to re-open in two years. The future prospects 
for Phi Phi business owners however remain positive.  The 
topography of the island and its unique natural beauty are 
likely to ensure it remains an attractive tourist destination.  If 
anything, the devastation at Phi Phi may provide an 
opportunity to correct previous over-development which led to 
significant environmental pressures on the area.  This aspect is 
discussed in more detail in Section 9.6. 
 
The Khao Lak area suffered substantial devastation with 
nearly all tourist infrastructures in the region affected to some 
degree.  The recovery of repairable resorts in the Khao Lak 
area is expected to take at least one year.  A major issue for the 
Khao Lak community will be the interdependent nature of 
tourism recovery, with few tourists attracted back into the area 
so long as a critical mass of tourist facilities remain closed.  
There is also the potential for a change in the character of the 
area, which before the tsunami had a high proportion of small, 
family run tourist hotels and restaurants.  The capital 
requirements for reconstruction, long timescales for recovery, 
and large areas of cleared land now available (where earlier 
buildings have been destroyed) has led to speculation of a 
future Khao Lak with a high proportion of large, 
internationally owned hotel chains (Bangkok Post, 13/01/05).  
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These longer term impacts and the characteristics of 
business that survive and those that do not will be explored 
in a return visit to Thailand by one of the authors (ED) in 
August 2005. 
 
The tsunami has also meant a change in clientele for those 
businesses in the heavily affected areas that were able to 
reopen soon after the event.  Relief volunteers and those 
attracted back to the area by cheap hotels and travel deals 
tend not to be the big spenders.  Devastated areas such as 
Khao Lak have also seen a growing trend of local and 
international disaster tourists, wanting to see the 
devastation for themselves; this is providing a much needed 
boost for those businesses able to reopen soon after the 
event (Phuket Gazette, 18/01/05).  
 
9.2 Fishing Industry 
 
Thailand is the worlds largest shrimp exporter.  Although, 
at a macro scale, some have estimated that the tsunami will 
have little impact on the overall industry (EIU, 2005), the 
local impact is significant.  Our team observed a large 
number of damaged shrimp farms.  The Thai Shrimp 
Association estimates that the tsunami has caused 
USD$500m damage, and killed more than 100 hatchery 
workers.  Shrimps, which are raised in seaside man-made 
saltwater lagoons, were washed away along with a great 
deal of equipment.  The jobs of up to 300,000 shrimp workers 
are at risk as a direct result of the tsunami (Thai Embassy DC, 
12/01/05).  
 
The tsunami also caused significant damage to the local 
fishing industry (Figure 19), with around 20% of officially 
registered boats suffering damage (EIU, 2005).  The 
Department of Fisheries estimates that a total of 7,446 fishing 
boats were lost (UNDP, 2005a). 
 
The fisheries industry contributes only about 1.7% of total 
GDP so represents a much smaller macro economic impact 
than Tourism.  The wide-scale devastation of whole fishing 
communities, and the loss of small boats used locally for 
transport and small scale fishing is likely to have significant 
social impacts for the affected communities though.  The 
capital required to repair or rebuild lost boats, as well as the 
loss of skilled fishermen with local knowledge of the fishing 
grounds, will have impacts for many years to come.  Of 
particular note is Ban Nam Kem Village in Khao Lak District 
which was particularly hard hit by the tsunami, with early 
estimates of up to half of the population dead or missing 
(WHO, 04/01/05). It should be noted that boats well offshore 
at the time the tsunami struck suffered no damage.  We spoke 
to one local fisherman who was approximately 10 km offshore 
when the tsunami struck, where he felt the tsunami as a 1 m 
high long-period swell.   
 
 
 
Figure 19.   At Ban Nam Kem, fishing and port facilities were destroyed, many lives were lost and the ecology of coastal 
fishing grounds altered. The economic recovery from the tsunami poses a significant challenge to this community 
and others like it along the Andaman coast (Photo ED). 
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9.3 Insurance Coverage 
 
The overall picture of insurance coverage for affected 
businesses is complex.  Many of the large tourist resorts, 
particularly those owned by multinational chains, either 
have insurance cover or because of their size, self insure 
against smaller losses.  During our visit however we spoke 
with many small business owners who either had no 
insurance cover, or whose insurance cover was limited 
primarily to fire damage and did not cover tsunami.  On Phi 
Phi Island none of the business owners we spoke to had 
insurance.  We were told that it is not possible to buy 
insurance cover for property on Phi Phi Island, but were 
unable to verify the reason for this. 
 
9.4 Business Recovery 
 
On the 12th of January the Thai Government approved more 
than 69 billion Baht in financial aid and credits for 
individuals and businesses affected by the tsunami. 
 
Soft loans (with interest rates lower than market values) and 
tax breaks which allow business owners to claim tsunami 
losses against tax have been offered to businesses in the 
affected area (Jantraprapaweth, 2005).  For example, our 
team spoke with a business owner in Patong Beach who had 
just secured from the bank a 24-month loan at a 2% rate of 
interest.  The capital for these loans was provided by the 
Government at 1% interest, with the bank adding on to this 
a 1% transaction management fee.   
 
As part of the recovery package, small business owners 
were also entitled to financial support of 20,000 baht, and 
fishermen with registered vessels damaged or lost were 
entitled to compensation of 10,000 and 66,000 baht 
respectively (FES and MAC, 2005).  Nearly five months 
after the tsunami, however, there is concern that aid 
packages for small business owners are still taking too long 
to process, with latest reports of 968 small businesses 
owners still awaiting any compensation (Phuket Gazette, 
13/05/05).  The processing of compensation claims is 
complicated as many business owners have lost all 
documentation, creating difficulties in verifying losses and 
confirming peoples identities.   
 
9.5 Flow-on Economic Effects  
 
The tourism industry accounts for around 6% of Thailands 
national GDP.  The impact of the tsunami is expected to be 
felt right across Thailand as discretionary spending is 
reduced.  One month after the tsunami some Thai industries, 
including car manufacturers, were predicting a substantial 
short-term slump in sales (EIU, 2005).   
 
In addition to those businesses directly affected by tsunami 
damage, businesses beyond the immediate damage areas 
also experienced a severe reduction in business.  One month 
after the tsunami, undamaged hotels were reporting only 
10% occupancy in what would normally be their peak tourist 
season.  Four months on from the tsunami, international 
passenger arrivals at Phuket airport were down 56% on the 
previous year (Phuket Gazette, 04/06/05).  This reduction in 
general tourist trade has flow-on effects throughout the general 
business communityreducing demand for other tourist 
services such as taxis, bars and souvenir sellers and in turn 
reducing the disposable income and spending of locals. 
 
Although the economic impact for the Andaman Coast region 
is significant, the macro economic impact for Thailand as a 
whole is much less severe.  The eastern coast of Thailand, 
which was unaffected by the tsunami, has a large number of 
tourist resorts, and many tourists can switch to these eastern 
resort areas (DCOMM, 2005). 
 
9.6 ‘Building Back Better’ 
 
The tsunami has devastated communities; but at the same time 
the devastation wrought on these communities opens up 
opportunities for changechange that prior to the event would 
not have been politically feasible.  In disaster literature, this 
concept is referred to as Building Back Better (Monday, 
2002, UNDP, 2005b) where the community seeks not to 
simply rebuild what was, but to look for opportunities to 
reduce future vulnerability to hazards.  The application of this 
concept was observed on Phi Phi Island, which prior to the 
tsunami had been intensively developed with shops 
encroaching right onto the beach frontage.  In the aftermath of 
the tsunami, local government officials indicated that 
encroached land would be reclaimed, and core areas of the 
beach would be re-planned and re-zoned to ensure that 
replacement architecture is to a lower density (Cummings, 
2005).   
 
At Patong Beach there is a move to limit the number of beach 
chairs and umbrellas allowed to return onto the beach margin.  
These moves however have been met with significant public 
resistance, and prior to the March national elections few 
decisions were being made.  This left the affected community 
with significant uncertainties as to how the recovery process 
would proceed.   
 
This highlights a tension for any community faced with 
recovering from major disaster.  On the one hand the 
community will want to get the recovery process underway as 
quickly as possible, whilst on the other hand time is needed to 
evaluate options and opportunities to build back better.  
Talking about these issues beforehand and agreeing a decision 
making process in advance that will be effective in a response 
and recovery setting is needed to negotiate through these often 
conflicting objectives. 
 
 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The tsunami in Thailand was not a single breaking wave  
rather it was a raging torrent or wall of water that surged 
145
repeatedly onto the land. Prior to the landfall of the first 
tsunami torrent the sea receded to below normal low tide 
levels for a period of several minutes  some witnesses 
claim up to 15 minutes. The opposite occurred in countries 
west of the rupture zone, where no initial recession was 
observed and the tsunami made first landfall as a wave 
crest. The waves off Thailand travelled obliquely along the 
coast from south to north, hitting the Phuket coast almost 25 
minutes before they arrived at localities in Phang-Nga 
province farther north.  
 
In places the water level was between one and three storeys 
high. Wave heights at individual localities varied according 
to the near-shore bathymetry; the highest waves occurring 
where the bays had a broad, shallow sea floor or extensive 
reefs or rock platforms. The outrush as the inundating 
waters retreated produced as much devastation as the 
incoming wave, causing deep scouring of the coast and 
sucking survivors out to sea. 
 
The main conclusion from these observations is that on a 
low-lying coast, over a distance inland of hundreds of 
metres to several kilometres, tsunami damage can be 
catastrophic. There are usually several wavesnot just 
oneand this caught many unawares. 
 
Modern engineered multi-storey structures will usually 
survive, although many engineered single-storey structures 
along the Thai coast were completely destroyed. Damage to 
non-structural elements, especially partition walls, cladding, 
roofing and coastal drainage and protection works, is 
extensive. Huge volumes of debris are created.  
 
Mortality rates are high due to the momentum of flows, the 
over-pressures, impact of entrained debris and the duration 
of the inundation. Catastrophic damage and high mortality 
were characteristic impacts of the tsunami torrent in 
Thailand wherever the waters exceeded several metres 
depth.  
 
No single measure can be expected to provide complete 
protection. Countervailing measures need to balance 
detection, warning, response, refuge and long-term planning 
for the siting of essential facilities. Saving lives is the key 
objective for future events and will be achieved principally 
by inland or vertical evacuation before a tsunami makes 
landfall. However, the required distance inland or above 
wave height will depend on the local geography and the 
depth of the torrent.  
 
Uniform setback distances for development on a coast may 
be ineffectual because the momentum of a tsunami torrent 
causes damage for a considerable distance inland and 
especially at estuaries and along rivers.  
 
New Zealand may never experience a tsunami event with 
consequences of such severity as the December 26 event, 
but the Thai experience indicates some shared 
vulnerabilities in coastal communities exposed to tsunami 
hazard including: 
 
o extensive development close to beaches, on sand spits 
and narrow coastal corridors; 
o no high ground for refuge in many of these areas 
o foreshores modified for coastal development by 
removing trees, lowering dunes to enhance ocean 
views and hardened coastal defence structures which 
could exacerbate wave run-up. 
Observations in Thailand suggest that green belts such as 
dunes, mangroves and dense coastal trees can significantly 
reduce the force of impact where tsunami water depths do not 
exceed a few metres. 
Previous assessments of tsunami hazard in New Zealand were 
based on static inundation levels (elevation) only. They are 
likely to underestimate the risk close to the coast because they 
do not account for the potential momentum of the flows
neither do they account for the sheltering effect of buildings 
and vegetation. Furthermore, while many of the affected 
localities in Thailand were holiday resorts, in New Zealand 
most coastal towns support permanent settlement with 
integrated economic activities and services. A tsunami striking 
a populated coastal area in New Zealand could therefore 
overwhelm local response and recovery arrangements. 
 
No changes to the New Zealand building codes are considered 
relevant for mitigating vulnerability to tsunami, but planning 
and emergency management requirements for low-lying areas 
should be reviewed, especially for essential facilities.  
 
Better understanding of the unique nature of tsunami hazards 
and the types of vulnerability will be crucial to minimizing the 
effects of future tsunami. Preparedness factors include 
capacity for self-evacuation, knowledge of designated routes 
and alternative refuges, training for those responsible for 
visitors or dependants in vulnerable locations and where 
practicable, sufficient warning. 
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